| Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents | ||||||
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Supreme Court of the United States |
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| Argued January 12, 1971 Decided June 21, 1971 |
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| Full case name | Webster Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics | |||||
| Citations | 403 U.S. 388 (more) 91 S. Ct. 1999; 29 L. Ed. 2d 619; 1971 U.S. LEXIS 23 |
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| Prior history | Dismissed, 276 F. Supp. 12 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); affirmed, 409 F.2d 718 (2nd Cir. 1969) | |||||
| Subsequent history | On remand, reversed, 456 F.2d 1339 (2nd Cir. 1972) | |||||
| Holding | ||||||
| Individuals have an implied cause of action against federal government officials who have violated their constitutional rights. Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. | ||||||
| Court membership | ||||||
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| Case opinions | ||||||
| Majority | Brennan, joined by Douglas, Stewart, White, Marshall | |||||
| Concurrence | Harlan | |||||
| Dissent | Burger | |||||
| Dissent | Black | |||||
| Dissent | Blackmun | |||||
| Laws applied | ||||||
| U.S. Const. amend. IV | ||||||
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)[1], was a case in which the United States Supreme Court ruled that an implied cause of action existed for an individual whose Fourth Amendment freedom from unreasonable search and seizures had been violated by federal agents. The victim of such a deprivation could sue for the violation of the Amendment itself, despite the lack of any federal statute authorizing such a suit. The existence of a remedy for the violation was implied from the importance of the right violated.
Bivens has been subsequently interpreted to create a cause of action against the federal government similar to the one 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates against the states.
Contents |
Federal Bureau of Narcotics agents searched the house of the plaintiff, Webster Bivens, and arrested him without a warrant. Drug charges were filed but later dismissed by a U.S. Commissioner (now called Magistrate Judge). Bivens filed a lawsuit alleging the violation of his Fourth Amendment freedom from unreasonable search and seizure. The government claimed that the violation only allowed for a state law claim for invasion of privacy, and that the Fourth Amendment provides no cause of action, but only a rebuttable defense for the FBN agents. The District Court agreed and dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and also for Bivens's failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Second Circuit affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on that secondary issue of whether a plaintiff can bring a claim in federal court based solely on an alleged violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Bivens was represented pro bono by Stephen A. Grant.[1]
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, laid down a rule that it will imply a private right of action for monetary damages where no other federal remedy is provided for the vindication of a constitutional right, based on the principle that for every wrong, there is a remedy. The court reasoned based upon a presumption that where there is a violation of a right, the plaintiff can recover whatever he could recover under any civil action, unless Congress has expressly curtailed that right of recovery, or there exist some "special factor counseling hesitation."
Justice Harlan voted with the majority to reverse the lower court, but also wrote a separate concurring opinion. Harlan particularly emphasized the special importance of constitutional rights. He presented that it was well-settled, even undeniable, that a suit for injunction based on a constitutional right was long recognized in the Federal courts. That being the case, where equally necessary, a suit for damages should be equally if not more acceptable. (Money damages were traditionally considered to be less onerous of a remedy than injunction, except in Constitutional Jurisprudence; in Edelman, Justice Rehnquist declared exactly the opposite, an assertion of dubious legal pedigree.)
Dissenting opinions were written by Chief Justice Burger, and by Justices Black and Blackmun.
Chief Justice Burger's dissent asserted that this decision was legislating, and should be left to Congress. Justice Black basically agreed with Burger, and worried about the growing docket. Justice Blackmun went a step further, declaring that this holding would lead to "another avalanche of new federal cases."